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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Mahlon Peck & Family, Inc., the plaintiff/appellant, was
the owner of real property who enlisted the services of the
defendants to help sell the real property. The corporation is
referred to as the "seller."
Lloyd R. Brooks, one of the defendants/appellees, is a
licensed real estate agent.
Robinson,

and

Denice

A.

Stanley W. Robinson, Donna
Wilson

Jepson,

the

other

defendants/appellees, are the brokers or owners of Century 21
Robinson & Wilson Realty.
as the "agent."

They are collectively referred to
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) and Utah Code Ann. §

78-31a-19(3)

because the Fourth District Court confirmed an arbitration
award and dismissed the seller's complaint with prejudice.
This appeal is taken, therefore, as a matter of right pursuant
to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CONFIRMING THE ARBITRATION
AWARD

"There is no special standard governing

[an appellate

court's] review of a district court's decision to confirm,
vacate, or modify an arbitration award." Buzas Baseball. Inc.
v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996),
quoting First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 131 L. Ed. 2d 985,
115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995). "In reviewing the order this
court grants no deference to the district court's conclusions
of

law but reviews them

for correctness." DeVore v.

Hosps.. Inc.. 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994).
review

of the trial court's factual findings

IHC

Appellate
is under a

clearly erroneous standard. DeVore. 884 P.2d at 1256.

1

h.

STANDARD

OF

REVIEW

FOR

REVIEWING

ARBITRATOR'S

MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW.
Manifest disregard of tho law is. a judicially created
doctrine

stemming

.1 1 ill i y

arbitrator exceeding his authority. If arbitrators manifestly
disregard t;hp law in making their decision, they can be said
tc have exceeds

•

than mere error as

to the 1 aw,

~; «- ^

the error must have been

obvious and capable of bei ng readily and instantly perceived
v e r a g e p e r s o n g U a jj J:*:J ec| |;: ::: s sr ; e a s a]l;;i
The arbitrator must appreciate the existence of

clearly

governing

\: :i

legal principle but decide to ignore

attention '
Inc.,

i t:

Buzas Baseball, i n c .

Vm

,J

salt Lake Trappers,

925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996); Merrill Lvnch. Pierce,

Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir, 1986).
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR REVIEWING ARB LTKATUU ,S AW'Alilll
W H I C H V I O L A T E S PUBLIC P O L I C Y .
The
ground

publi
for

.

vacating

xceptii iiii in
arbitration

i "in J ici » 1 !!_ j

i tvd\ e, ,1

award.

United

Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 u,s
i

E :1

2 ' ~" 5. 1 08 S

exception •

Ct

See

29, 47, mi

36 1 (11 98 7) . "Th

h I i n pn I iry

rooted :ii n th = common law doctrine ol a court# s

power to refuse to enforce a contract that violates public
po 1 icy

Seymour v, Blue Cross/Blue Shield.

988 F ' 2 ::i
2

1020#

1023

(10th Cir. 1993). The court must find a well-

defined and dominant policy against the described

conduct

after a review of the relevant laws and legal precedents. Id.
at 1024 quoting United Paperworkers. 484 U.S. at 44.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was it manifest error or a violation of public

policy when the arbitrator failed to rule that the agent owed
the seller a fiduciary duty to disclose to the seller the
agent's

prior

contacts

and

agency

relationship

with

the

intended buyer regarding the sale of the plaintiff's property?
2.

Was it error for the arbitrator to find that the

agent's conduct did not constitute a breach of his fiduciary
duty

in

1) failing

to disclose to the

seller his

prior

contacts with the buyer regarding the purchase of the seller's
property, 2) failing to make reasonable efforts to ascertain
the true value of the seller's property, and 3) failing to
seek out other potential buyers for the property?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
The Utah

Arbitration

Act,

Utah Code Annotated § 78-3la-

16, provides in pertinent part: "An award which is confirmed,
modified, or corrected by the court shall be treated and
3

enforced in all respects as a judgment." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Arbitration

Act

specifically allows an appeal to

be taken from any court order confirming an arbitration award.

Utah Arbitration

Act,

Section 78-31a-19 reads:

An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as
provided by law for appeals in civil actions from
any court order:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

denying a motion to compel arbitration;
granting a motion to stay arbitration;
confirming
or
denying
confirmation
arbitration award;
modifying or correcting an award; or

(5)

vacating an award without directing rearbitration.

of

an

(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2, outlines certain violations
for which real estate brokers or agents can be penalized. Some
of the specific violations found in Section 61-2-11 relevant
to this case are:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction
without the informed consent of all parties;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his
principal in a real estate transaction;
(17) any
dealing.

other

conduct

Hopkins v. Wardley

which

Corporationf

constitutes
611 P. 2d

dishonest
1204

(Utah

1980), holds that a real estate broker, as the seller 7 s agent,
owed the seller a fiduciary duty of full disclosure of facts

4

material to the principal's business.
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp. .
1983) , holds that a real estate

666 P*2d 876 (Utah

salesman has

a duty

to

exercise reasonable skill and diligence on behalf of his
principal

and

the

principal

is

justified

in

relying

on

information received from the salesman and broker without
making independent investigation.

Reese v. Harper. 319 P.2d

410, 412 (Utah 1958), states:
[b]ecause of the specialized service the real
estate broker offers in acting as an agent for his
client there arises a fiduciary relationship
between them; it is incumbent upon him to apply his
abilities and knowledge to the advantage of the man
he serves; and to make full disclosure of all facts
which his principal should know in transacting his
business.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.

The seller appeals from an arbitrator7s decision which
found "no cause of action" when:
1) the real estate agent did not disclose to the seller that:
* — t h e intended buyer, an acquaintance of 25 - 30 years,
first enlisted the agent to find property for the buyer;
* — t h e intended buyer and the agent looked at various
parcels before the buyer asked the agent to approach the
seller to see if the seller wanted to sale his property;
2)

and, after the agent signed a listing agreement with the

seller claiming to solely represent the seller, the agent:

*—provided no market analysis to the seller;
*—recommended accepting an earnest money in an amount
less than the industry standard;
*—assisted in arranging a note for the balance of the
purchase price with an interest rate that was less than
the industry standard;
* — d i d not place any Mfor sale11 signs on the property;
* — d i d not do any advertising or prepare any flyers for
the property;
*—took
no action to formalize the rezone from
agricultural land to commercial land for 15 months;
* — d i d not propose any counter offers on behalf of the
seller even though the buyer needed two extensions to
arrange financing and the sale did not close for 17
months during a time of explosive growth in the Utah
Valley real estate market;
*—RELISTED THE PROPERTY FOR SALE FOR $425# 000 FOR THE
BUYER ONLY 6 1/2 MONTHS AFTER THE CLOSING WHERE THE BUYER
PURCHASED THE PROPERTY FROM THE SELLER FOR ONLY $134,880,
A 315% INCREASE IN JUST OVER SIX MONTHS.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

The seller filed a complaint against the agent seeking
damages

for

fraudulent

the

agent's

breach

non-disclosure,

of

his

fraudulent

fiduciary

duty,

misrepresentation,

breach of his statutory obligations as a real estate agent
under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

61-2-11,

and

unjust

enrichment.

Subsequently, the parties agreed in arbitration.

On or about

January 15, 1997, the parties appeared before Stephen Nebeker
for an arbitration hearing.
arbitrator

On or about April 9, 1997, the

issued an opinion.

The opinion declared

that

sellers had no cause of action against the agent, and denied
seller's claims.
Arbitration

Award

The agent submitted a Motion to Confirm
and

Enter

Judgment

of

Dismissal

with
6

Prejudice to Judge Howard Maetani on or about May 14, 1997.
Because none of the statutory grounds specifically set forth
in the Utah Arbitration

Act

for a trial court to modify or

vacate the arbitration award directly apply in the present
case, the seller did not move the trial court to modify the
award. Judge Maetani entered the final judgment oonfirming the
arbitrator's award on or about July 23, 1997.

On or about

August 22, 1997, the appellant filed a notice of appeal.
C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Lloyd Brooks, a real estate agent, had an ongoing

relationship with Carl Mellor, the intended buyer in this
matter, having known him for "25 - 30" years.

Brooks at 14.

Additionally, the agent had represented, the intended buyer in
a previous real estate matter. Mellor depo at 13; Brooks depo
at 15.
2.

During September or October of 1990, the buyer

approached the agent several times and requested the agent's
assistance in obtaining some commercial land on which to
relocate the buyer's business. The two men looked through the
agent's current

listings and found nothing of interest.

Brooks depo at 16, 19; Mellor depo at 14.
3.

The buyer specifically asked the agent to approach

the seller Peck to determine if his family corporation's
7

property was for sale, and the agent did so.

The intended

buyer testified:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

So, did you ask him [the realtor] to look
for the Peck property.
Yes, I did ask him to look. And I said,
"I'd like to see if this property is for
sale."
Did you know who the owners were at that
time?
Yes.
And did you approach Mr. Brooks to assist
you in finding out the details of that
property?
Yes.

Mellor depo at 14-16.
4.

The buyer had established an amount of $15,000 per

acre as the maximum amount he was willing to pay for the
prospective property.
A.

Q.
A.

He testified:

I told Lloyd that I would not pay more
than 15,000 an acre, told him to try to
get it for 12, and that I would not go
over 15. And he came and said that they
were asking for 16. And I was - - it was
over my figure.
So your figure was 15,000 then?
That was what I had programed myself to go.

Mellor depo at 17.
This amount was based solely on the amount the buyer
"could

afford" to pay and not on any estimate

property's value.
5.

of the

Id. at 46.

The seller indicated a willingness to sell the

property, but not for the $14,000 per acre price indicated by
8

the agent. The agent informed the seller that, dependent upon
the annexation of the property into the City of Lehi and
rezoning it as commercial, $16,000 per acre would be the top
selling price for the property.

The seller relied on the

agent's expertise as a realtor in determining that $16,000 per
acre was a fair price for his property.

Brooks depo at 25-26;

Peck depo at 32.
6.

The seller and the agent entered into a seven-month

listing agreement on October 25, 1990.
7.
"Agency

Paragraph

10 of the listing

Disclosure," which was

filled

Exhibit "3."
agreement,
out

by

entitled

the

agent,

indicates that the agent represented only the seller and that
written disclosure of the agency relationship was provided to
the seller.
8.

At all times prior to and including the closing of

the sale from the seller to the buyer, the agent represented
himself

as

the

seller's

exclusive

agent.

Complaint

and

Answer, paragraphs 1 and 25.
9.

The agent did not disclose to the seller that the

buyer had previously asked the agent to determine whether the
seller's land was for sale nor did he disclose that the buyer
had already set a maximum price of $15,000 per acre.

9

10•

Following verbal communications between the agent

and the buyer, an Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered
into

between

the

seller

and

the

established at $16,000 per acre.

buyer,

with

price

The Earnest Money Sales

Agreement set a closing date of May 31, 1991.
11.

the

Exhibit "2".

Two extensions were granted, extending the closing

date through March 1992.

Exhibits "6" and "8." The closing

occurred in March 1992, almost a year and a half after the
original Earnest Money Sales Agreement was signed.
12.

At the time the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was

signed, commercial and residential real estate values were
increasing significantly throughout Utah County.

By the date

of the second contract

1991, land

extension

in September

values were increasing by 1% per month.
13.

Brooks depo at 79.

Between the time the earnest money contract was

signed and the date of the closing, the seller's property was
annexed into the City of Lehi, rezoned as commercial, and the
new Lehi 1-15 was constructed, increasing the value of the
property.
14.

Complaint and Answer, 1 17; Exhibit "11."
The rezone was granted by Lehi City at the seller's

request and at the urging of the agent because commercial
zoning, according to the agent, was the "highest value of the
property" and the agent "thought we could get (seller) pretty
10

good money out of the property by annexing into the city and
zoning it commercial." Brooks depo at 42-44.
15.

The seller had the right to change the conditions of

the sale, including the price of the property, at either time
he signed an extension on the sale, and he had no obligation
to relist the property with the agent.

Brooks depo at 39.

However, the agent failed to explain these options to the
seller.
16.

Despite the fact that property values had increased

dramatically
increased

and

that

rezoning

the

property

had

its value, the agent

did

not recall

further

doing

any

research to determine if the property had gone up in value at
the time of the signing of the last extension.

Brooks depo at

46.
17.

In the listing agreement entered into between the

agent and the seller, the agent agreed to use reasonable
efforts to sell the land.

Exhibit "3." Reasonable efforts

typically include placing a "for sale" sign on the property,
among other things such as preparing flyers and advertising.
Brooks depo at 13-14; Exhibits 19 and 20.
not done

for the seller.

(They were

These things were
done

later on

the

relisting.) Additionally, despite having some inquiries about
the property, the agent did not make an attempt to procure a
11

"backup offer11 as is typically done in case the original sale
falls through.
18.

Brooks depo at 36-37.

Only six months after closing the seller's sale of

the property to the buyer, the agent again listed the property
for sale, this time for the buyer. The property was listed at
$425,000, 315% more than the amount that the agent had sold
the property for only six months earlier.
19.

Exhibit 17.

The buyer received several offers for the property

in excess of $275,000. Mellor depo at 40-45; Exhibits 21-27.
A sale closed in November 1994 for almost $38,000 per acre.
Mellor depo at 45.
20.

The agent received a commission for the subject

property in both the sale for the seller and the subsequent
sale for the buyer.

Mellor depo at 37-38.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Although the Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized
the

"longstanding

inexpensive

methods

public
of

policy

adjudicating

favoring

speedy

disputes," Allred

and
v.

Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P. 2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996), it
has also suggested that review may be necessary to assure the
"proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial rights of
the parties were respected." DeVore v. IHC Hosps., Inc.. 884
P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994).

As indicated in Buzas

Baseball
12

v.

Salt

Lake Trappers,

925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996), federal

courts have recognized "manifest disregard of the law" as a
ground

for review.

judicially

created

"Manifest disregard
doctrine

stemming

of the

from

authority statutory ground." Id., citing Wildo

the

law is a
exceeding

v. Swan,

346

U.S. 427, 436-37.
The Utah Supreme Court has also ruled that there is a
public policy exception for overturning an arbitration award.
The basis of this exception is the common law doctrine that
the courts have the power to refuse to enforce an arbitration
opinion that violates public policy or law. Buzas Baseball v.
Salt Lake Trappers. 925 P.2d 941, 951
exception

(Utah 1996).

This

allows the courts to maintain the integrity of

public policy standards that have been established in Utah.
In Utah it is a well-defined public policy that a real estate
agent has a fiduciary duty to his principal and that he should
honor that obligation or be held responsible for the breach of
that duty.

The arbitrator's decision in this case violates

this public policy. To allow this arbitration decision to
stand would set aside both statutory and case law precedents
that work to maintain a public policy which protects innocent
parties

from

practices.

real

estate

agents who

engage

in

nefarious

Public policy is against allowing realtors to use
13

their license as a badge to defraud innocent people instead of
the badge of competence and integrity that it should be.

ARGUMENT
I.

AN ARBITRATOR'S DISREGARD OF THE LAW IS BASIS FOR A
REVERSAL OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD.

The purpose of this appeal

is not to challenge

the

factual findings of the arbitrator, but to bring before the
Court an issue of law regarding the existence and breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by the agent to the seller.

In a recent

case, the Utah Supreme Court left open the issue of whether
manifest disregard of the law, a judicially created doctrine,
may provide grounds for reviewing an arbitration award.

In

footnote 8 of Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d 941, the Court states
that it reserves the issue of whether manifest disregard of
the law is recognized in Utah.
Given that the statute specifically provides that an
award confirmed by a court should be treated in all respects
the same as a judgment, Utah

Code Ann.,

§ 78-31a-16, awards

that disregard established law should be subject to appellate
review.

Public policy should require that an arbitration

award not manifestly disregard clearly established statutes
and judicial decisions dealing with the same situation.

14

The seller recognizes that public policy supports the use
of arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of settling
disputes.
achieved

That policy objective, however, can only be
if

arbitrators

are

not

allowed

to

disregard the law, as defined by this Court.

manifestly
Otherwise,

participants will soon perceive that the arbitration process
and the unreviewable decisions of a renegade arbitrator lack
consistency, predictability and fairness.
The
decisions

perception
that

that

disregard

arbitration
controlling

results
law

in

unfair

will

defeat

arbitration's purpose as an efficient just and cost-effective
alternative to traditional litigation.

Potential litigants

will be extremely reluctant to participate in a process they
may agree is less expensive than traditional litigation, but
that will not result in fair decisions or protect the rights
of all parties. Similarly, the public is likely to refuse to
accept mandatory arbitration provisions that could otherwise
be included in many contracts.

By allowing the doctrine of

manifest disregard of the law to be a basis of review and
requiring arbitrators to not disregard clearly established
lines of legal precedent, this Court can monitor and preserve
a measure of predictability, which is necessary to establish
confidence in the arbitration process.
15

In

the

present

case,

the

arbitrator

manifestly

disregarded clear Utah law on the existence and breach of the
fiduciary responsibility of a real estate agent towards his
principal•

This

arbitration

disregard

award

of

the

to be appealed

law

should

so that

allow

the

an obvious

and

readily perceivable error may be corrected and the legitimacy
of the arbitration process may be maintained.
As

the

Supreme

Court's

recent

ruling

Buzas

in

specifically reserved the issue of whether or not manifest
disregard
addresses

of

the

law

below

is grounds

the

for

arbitrator's

appeal,
highly

the

questionable

application of Utah law to the facts of the case.
should

therefore

issue

a

ruling

holding

seller

The Court

that

manifest

disregard of the law may provide grounds for appellate court
review of arbitration awards.
II.

IT WAS ERROR FOR
DISREGARD THE LAW.

THE

ARBITRATOR

TO

MANIFESTLY

Along with the public policy exception the Buzas court
also recognized that the theory of manifest disregard of the
law may also provided a basis for vacating or modifying an
arbitration award.
basis

for

this

Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 951.

exception

stems

from

the

arbitrator cannot exceed his authority. Id.

idea

that

The
an

Although the
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supreme court noted that the bounds of this doctrine have
never

been

defined,

it

did

set

out

certain

criteria

in

applying the exception.
The

court

found

that

more

than

a

misunderstanding of the law must be shown.

simple

error

or

The error must be

obvious in nature and readily perceivable by an average person
qualified to be an arbitrator.
the

arbitrator,

knowing

attention to it. Id.

of

Further, it must be shown that
the

law,

decided

not

to

pay

These requirements are satisfied by the

facts of this case.
In

seller's

pre-arbitration

brief,

the

seller

specifically presented the issues of whether it was a breach
of his fiduciary duty for the agent to fail to disclose prior
relations with the buyer, fail to seek out other buyers, and
fail to ascertain the fair market value of the property.
During the arbitration the seller carefully and thoroughly
presented the status of the law on a realtor's fiduciary duty
and what constituted

a breach of that duty.

Using

both

statutes and case law, the seller presented evidence that made
it clear that all three of the agent's failures constituted
breaches of a realtor's fiduciary duty. Throughout the course
of the arbitration, the seller presented evidence establishing
that

all

three

of

these

failures

occurred.

While

the
17

arbitrator's opinion does refer to the fair market value of
the property, he makes absolutely no reference to findings on
the other two issues.
In this case the arbitrator simply chose to ignore the
clearly defined law.

The arbitrator did not say that the

seller had made an effort to determine the fair market value.
The arbitrator did not say that the seller had disclosed his
relationship with the buyer or that he had tried to find other
buyers. Utah law clearly states what constitutes a breach of
the fiduciary duty of a realtor.

That law was made known to

the arbitrator. Facts establishing the failures of the agent
were clearly presented.

The arbitrator simply did not apply

the law to those facts but he applied his own definition of
what constitutes a breach in disregard of the obvious and
readily perceivable law.
An arbitrator cannot set his own definition of the law
above firm precedents and clear statutory language. He cannot
manifestly disregard the controlling authority on the issue
upon which he is ruling. In Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec.
Inc. , 847 F.2d

631

(10th Cir. 1988), the

10th Circuit

articulated the same standards for the use of the manifest
disregard theory as were set out by the Utah Supreme Court in
Buzas, but also went on to point out that the United States
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Supreme Court has stressed that an arbitrator does "not sit to
dispense his own brand of [arbitrary] justice."

The court

also noted that an award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the controlling authority. Jenkins 847
F.2d

at 634

(quoting United

Steelworkers or America v.

Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (I960)).
In the face of obvious and readily perceivable authority,
the arbitrator decided to apply his own definition of what
constituted a breach of a realtor's fiduciary duty.

These

actions on the part of the arbitrator constitute a manifest
disregard of the law and as such the award should be vacated.
III. CONFIRMATION OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD IS
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
In Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers. 925 P.2d 941,
951 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was
a public policy exception for overturning an arbitration
award. The basis of this exception is the common law doctrine
that the courts have the power to refuse to enforce an
arbitration opinion that violates public policy or law. Id.
This exception allows the courts to maintain the integrity of
public policy standards that have been established in Utah.
The Supreme Court has indicated that for this exception
to apply, the court must find a well-defined and dominant
public policy that would be negatively

impacted by the
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arbitration award.

Relevant laws and legal precedents are to

be reviewed in determining if a dominate public policy is
involved in an arbitration award. Id.

After reviewing the

facts of this case in light of Utah law, it is apparent that
the arbitration opinion in this case does have a negative
impact on a clearly defined public policy.
In Utah it is a well-defined public policy that a real
estate agent has a fiduciary duty to his principal and that he
should honor that obligation or be held responsible for the
breach of the duty.

This policy is clearly established in

statutory law and in legal precedent. U.C.A. § 61-2-11 (1997);
Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., 611 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1980); Reese v.
Harper, 329 P.2d 410 (Utah 1958); Phillips v. JCM Development
Corp.f 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983); Swallows v. Laney, 691 P.2d
874, (N.M. 1984); Jones v. Maestas, 696 P.2d 920 (Idaho App.
1985); Adams v. Cheney. 661 P.2d 434 (Mont. 1983).
The Utah Code has recognized the fact that a real estate
agent has a fiduciary duty and establishes harsh penalties for
the breach of that duty.

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11(16) allows

the Division of Real Estate to impose penalties on a real
estate broker who is guilty of "breaching a fiduciary duty
owed

by

a

licensee

transactions."

to

his

principal

in

real

estate

The penalties that can result from a breach
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of the duty may

include

suspension

broker's license or probation.
There

are also

or revocation

of the

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11.

criminal penalties

since

a breach

of

the

fiduciary duty as a violation of this section of the code is
a Class A misdemeanor.

Furthermore, individuals injured by a

breach of the fiduciary duty may recover triple damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17(4).

See

The serious treatment of a real

estate agent's fiduciary duty in the Utah Code establishes
Utah's strong public policy that a real estate agent should be
considered a fiduciary of his principal and that he honor that
duty.
The case law in Utah also clearly establishes a strong
public policy in favor of regulating a real estate agent's
relationship with his principal.
410

(Utah

fiduciary
clients.

1950),

established

relationship

exists

the

Reese v. Harper, 329 P.2d
clear

between

a

precedent
realtor

that
and

a

his

Reese discussed that fiduciary duty and established

that a realtor must use his skill exclusively to advance the
interest of his principal, for "it is incumbent upon

[the

agent] to apply his abilities and knowledge to the advantage
of the man he serves; and to make full disclosure of all facts
which his principal should know in transacting the business."
Id. at 412.
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The Reese court quoted with approval a Virginia case that
stated it is the agent's "duty to inform his principal of all
facts which might influence his principal in accepting or
rejecting the offer." Id. at 413 (quoting Duncan v.

Barbour,

49 S.E.2d 260, 265).
The unique fiduciary duty owed by a real estate agent to
his client was stressed by the court in .Reese because an agent
licensed by the state is permitted "to hold himself out to the
public as qualified by training and experience to render a
specialized service in the field of real estate transactions."
Id. at 412. The court went on to state:
There rests upon him the responsibility of honestly
and fairly representing the interests of those who
engage his services . . . [and] persons who entrust
their business to such agents are entitled to
repose some degree of confidence that they will be
loyal to such trust and that they will, with
reasonable diligence and in good faith, represent
the interests of their clients. Unless the law
demands this standard, instead of being the badge
of competence and integrity it is supposed to be,
the license would serve only as a foil to lure the
unsuspecting public in to be duped by people more
skilled and experienced in such affairs than are
they.
Both Utah statutes and case law recognize the existence and
significance of a realtor's fiduciary duty to his client. The
public policy behind imposing a fiduciary duty and applying
penalties for the breach of that duty on those realtors
licensed by the state assure that the integrity of the state

license

is maintained

protected.
whether

and that the citizens

of Utah

are

A major public policy question in this case is

a realtor has been allowed to hold

out his Utah

license as a foil and whether a Utah citizen looking to sell
his property so he could retire has been protected as the
state intended.
While it is clear that such a duty is breached when a
realtor withholds

or

fails to

fully

disclose

information

pertinent to the sale, this is not the only conduct which can
result in a breach of fiduciary duty.
Realty

Co.,

In Smith

v.

Carroll

335 P.2d 67 (Utah 1959), the Utah Supreme Court

specifically outlined another of a realtor's duties to his
principal.

The court in Smith

found that a realtor has a duty

to "determine the reasonable value of the property." Id. The
court made it clear that the realtor's failure to do so would
not be justified even if he had merely neglected to obtain the
reasonable

market

value

of

the

property.

Id.

at

69.

Mr. Brooks, the agent in the case at hand, as a realtor, had
a duty to the seller to take significant steps to ascertain
the reasonable fair market value of the property in question.
According to the Utah Supreme Court in Smith,

the seller in

the

on

case

at hand

was

justified

in relying

the

price

provided by the agent, a realtor "more skilled and experienced
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in

such

affairs"

Christopulous,

than

he

and

his

wife.

In

Reich

v.

256 P.2d 238 (Utah 1953) the Utah Supreme Court

stated the real estate agent "had a duty to represent (the
seller's)

interest

in

good

faith,

to

discharge

it

with

reasonable skill and diligence and to disclose to them all
pertinent facts which would have materially affected their
interest."

Reich,

see also Smith,

335 P.2d at 68.

The arbitration award in this case would work against
these public policies.

The record shows that the agent had a

fiduciary duty to the seller and that he failed to disclose
his prior contact with the buyer.

The record also shows that

the agent failed to make a reasonable effort to seek out other
potential buyers, and that he failed to take any steps to
determine the true fair market value of the property.

All of

these actions breach the agents' fiduciary duty to the seller.
To allow this arbitration opinion to stand would set aside
both

statutory

law and

case

law precedents

that work to

maintain a well-defined public policy in Utah.
IV.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO FIND THAT THE
AGENT DID NOT OWE SELLER GENERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES.

In addition to the statutes governing breach of fiduciary
duty by a realtor there are several Utah cases which also
address the issue. Reese

discusses the fiduciary duty between

a broker and his principal.

A realtor must use his skill
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exclusively to advance the interests of his principal, for "it
is incumbent upon [the agent] to apply his abilities and
knowledge to the advantage of the man he serves; and to make
full disclosure of all facts which his principal should know
in transacting the business." Reese

at 412.

The agent clearly committed a breach of his fiduciary
duty by failing to determine a reasonable value for the
seller's property.

The failure to do so not only netted the

agent two commissions on the same property within a matter of
months, but it also netted his long-time client and friend,
the buyer, a whopping profit.

The agent also failed to

disclose to the seller that the seller was not obligated to go
through with the sale and had the option to renegotiate each
time the earnest money sales agreement expired

and was

extended. The agent failed to inform the seller that he could
easily get more than $16,000 per acre for his land, which the
agent himself must have believed, since he testified real
property was appreciating at 1% per month. The agent's breach
is also evidenced by his listing the very same property for
more than three times the selling price only six months after
the sale to the buyer was finalized.
The seller's reliance on the agent's misrepresentations
concerning facts material to the transaction caused the seller
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to sell his land at a price that was far less than the true
fair market value.
V.

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO FIND THAT THE
AGENT'S CONDUCT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF HIS
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE SELLER.

At the time the original Earnest Money Sales Agreement
was signed, commercial and residential real estate values were
increasing throughout Utah County.

Northern Utah County,

where the seller's land is located, experienced the greatest
increase in value due to its proximity to Salt Lake Valley.
Between the 1990 listing and when the first contract extension
was signed in May 1991, land values in Utah County had
increased 11.53%.
second

contract

Exhibit 30.
extension

By September 1991, when the

was

signed,

land

values

had

increased even more. In addition to this general increase in
land values, during this same period seller, had accomplished
the annexation of the land into the City of Lehi, the property
was

rezoned

as

commercial,

and

interchange was being constructed.

the

new

Lehi

freeway

These factors had the

effect of further increasing the value of the land.
During the year and a half that it took agent to finally
complete the sale of the property to the buyer, the agent
never once informed the seller that real estate values in the
area had drastically

increased.

Neither had

the agent
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disclosed to the seller that his land had gone up in value
because it had been annexed into the City of Lehi, rezoned as
commercial, and the proximity of the property to the new 1-15
freeway interchange.

The agent had an affirmative duty to

make those disclosures to the seller, yet he failed to do so.
His silence breached his duty to his seller. The agent, as a
realtor by profession, obviously was aware of the value of
real estate and the upward trend of the marketplace for land
in northern Utah County. He understood that the value of land
in the area was going up for a number of reasons, including
the construction of the new freeway interchange nearby, the
rezoning of the property, and the general increase in property
value in the area. If, for some reason, the agent was unaware
of the true value of the land, or how the rezoning and freeway
interchange would affect the value of the land, he had a duty
to make all reasonable efforts to ascertain the increasing
reasonable value of the land.

The agent, however, could not

recall doing any research that would have helped determine
whether the seller's property had increased in value during
the period of time following the signing of the original
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Brooks depo at 46. According
to the Utah Supreme Court in Smith, the agent had a duty to
determine the increasing value of the seller's property and to
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disclose this information to seller, his client.

The agent

failed to do so and thereby breached his fiduciary duty to the
seller.
The agent further breached his fiduciary duty to the
seller by failing to disclose a conflict of interest which
existed by reason of (a) the agent's real estate and business
dealings with the buyer immediately prior to this transaction;
and (b) that the buyer had previously contacted the agent,
requesting that agent look for land suitable for the buyer's
needs at a predetermined price, specifically requesting that
the agent inquire about the seller's property, prior to the
agent's

contacting

the

seller

and

listing

the

seller's

property.
The buyer approached the agent and told the agent he was
looking for property on which to locate his business. Brooks
depo at 15. The two men searched a listing of properties the
agent had for sale, but found nothing of interest to the
buyer.

Id. at 16.

determine whether

The buyer then asked the agent to

several pieces of land,

including the

seller's property, were for sale. Mellor depo at 14-15. The
buyer set the price he was willing to pay for the property.
Only after the buyer requested that the agent inquire about
the seller's property did the agent approach the seller about
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selling his property.

As an agent for the buyer, the agent

should have disclosed his conflict of interest to the seller,
yet

he

not

only

failed

to

do

so,

he

affirmatively

misrepresented his agency by his own hand on paragraph 10 of
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.

Exhibit M 3 . M This failure

constituted yet another breach of the agent's fiduciary duty
to the seller.
Furthermore, the agent breached his fiduciary duty to the
seller by failing to inform the seller that he was under no
obligation to go through with the sale under the terms of the
original Earnest Money Sales Agreement once that agreement had
expired.

In his deposition, agent acknowledged that seller

was under no such obligation.

Brooks depo at 39.

Upon the

expiration of the original Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the
seller could have renegotiated the price of the land, declined
to sell at all, or changed realtors had he known of his
agent's conflict.

The agent failed to disclose these options

to the seller and the seller agreed to extensions on the sale
without seeking any other changes in terms. The seller signed
the extensions without being advised that it would be in his
best interest to let the contracts expire and place the land
on the market at a price more in line with the true market
value.
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The seller rightfully relied on his agent to have the
knowledge and expertise to determine the fair market value of
the land, or to conduct a proper inquiry to determine the fair
market value of seller7s land. The seller relied on his agent
to aggressively represent the interests of the seller, not to
mislead him in order to help the subsequent buyer get a
bargain price on the land.

The seller was led to believe by

the statements and actions of the agent that the agent was
working

for him

and him

alone.

Utah

law holds these

assumptions and beliefs on the part of the seller to be
reasonable and valid by reason of the fiduciary duty owed by
the agent

to the seller.

The agent's

conduct

clearly

constituted a breach of that fiduciary duty.
The agent's breach of fiduciary duty cost the seller
$74,991.06, the difference between the price the seller
received for his land and the appraisal price on the date of
the last extension.

In addition, the seller is entitled to

interest on this amount from the date of the sale of the
property to the buyer.

Furthermore, under Utah Code Ann.

§ 61-2-17(4) the seller was entitled to three times the
commission received by the agent from the two sales as treble
damages because the agent profited from the breach of his
fiduciary duty and his duty of loyalty to the seller.

The
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arbitrator failed to consider the impact that Brooks' dual
agency had on the sales price of the property.
did

not

adequately

address

whether

the

reasonable in light of the circumstances.

The arbitrator

sales

price

was

Whether or not the

price defendants set for the Peck property was reasonable
depends upon whether the highest and best use of the property
is for commercial or residential use.
record

indicates

that

all

parties

The evidence in the

acknowledged

that

the

property was suited for commercial use and that it was "worth
much more" as commercial.

Brooks depo at 25, 42, 43.

1. The property was identified by Brooks and Mellor as a
desirable location for Mellor's commercial use.

Mellor depo

at 16; Brooks depo at 17.
2.

Don Gurney, an appraiser with over twenty years

experience and ten years of specialization in the appraisal of
commercial property in Utah County, concluded that the highest
and

best

use

of

this

property

is

commercial.

Guerney

appraisal at 9.
3.

Mellor, the buyer, determined that the property was

well suited for his commercial business.

He bought the land

for commercial use and turned around and sold it as commercial
property.
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4.

Robert Young, a potential purchaser was willing to

pay $275,000.00 for the property as commercial land. Earnest
Money Agreement, Seller's Arbitration Exhibit 21; Mellor depo
at 41.
5. The subsequent purchasers of the property, Allred and
Robbins, also believed the Peck land to be desirable as
commercial property and paid $320,000 for it. Mellor depo at
45.
The only person who believes that this property, situated
along the State Street corridor and within sight and hearing
of

1-15,

Carpenter.

was

best

suited

for

residential

use

is Kent

The appraisal by Carpenter takes the astounding

position Peck's property is best suited for residential use
rather than commercial use.

Carpenter appraisal at 27.

Carpenter takes that position even though he notes that
approval for the commercial zoning and annexation by Lehi was
"virtually assured" and that the annexation and rezone could
have been obtained at "any time." Carpenter appraisal at 23,
77.
Carpenter's conclusion that the property is best suited
for residential use is not surprising considering his very
limited experience in conducting commercial land appraisals.
Carpenter stated that this appraisal was only his fifth
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commercial land appraisal in Utah, This was his first ever in
Utah County. His prior experience was in California where he
reviewed

appraisals

done

by

others.

In

contrast

to

Mr. Gurney/s twenty years of continuous work as an appraiser,
Mr. Carpenter is no longer working as an appraiser. Carpenter
had not lived in Utah since 1981. He had, in fact, only moved
back to Utah in 1995, the same year he was hired by the
defendant to conduct this appraisal.

The Utah County market

which Carpenter was acquainted with in 1981 was very different
then the same market in 1992.

Carpenter was not present in

Utah or Utah County during the time in question to feel the
energy that was stimulating the real estate market to record
levels.
CONCLUSION
The arbitration award is subject to review by the Utah
Supreme

Court under

the

judicially

created

doctrine of

manifest disregard of the law doctrine. The agent did owe a
fiduciary

duty

to

the

seller

to

disclose

his

prior

relationship with the buyer regarding the sale of the seller's
property, to make reasonable efforts to seek out other
potential buyers, and to make reasonable efforts to ascertain
the true fair market value of the property.

The facts show

that the agent's conduct in affirmatively concealing his prior
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contacts with The buyer regarding the possible purchase of the
seller's property, failing to seek out other potential buyers
for the property, and failing to make reasonable efforts to
ascertain the true value of the seller's property constituted
a breach of his fiduciary duty to seller•
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